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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3814 
___________ 
 
XING BIN LI, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No.:  A077-027-160) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Alberto J. Riefkohl 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 30, 2014 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 30, 2014) 
___________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Xing Bin Li petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 Li, a native of China, entered the United States in May 1998.  He was charged as 
removable as an alien present in the United States who had not been admitted or paroled.  
Li applied for asylum and withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT).  In April 1999, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found Li removable 
and denied his applications for relief.  The BIA summarily dismissed his appeal in March 
2002 for failure to file a brief.  Over eleven years later in July 2013, Li filed a motion to 
reopen alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and changed country conditions.  The 
BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Li filed a petition for review.   
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the denial of a motion to 
reopen for abuse of discretion.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Under this standard, we may reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, 
or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  An alien 
generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no 
later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.”  
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 
 Li argues that he was entitled to reopen his proceedings due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel because he was represented by the Porges Law Firm, and the firm’s 
lawyers did not file a timely brief before the BIA.  He submitted an opinion by the New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division in which it disbarred Robert Porges.  The court 
stated that Porges engaged in racketeering by preparing and submitting false applications 
for asylum for Chinese aliens between 1993 and September 2000.  A.R. at 28-29.  The 
BIA determined that Li had not complied with the requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 
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I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), for establishing an ineffective assistance claim and had not 
shown due diligence in raising his claim. 
 Li argues that he should not have been required to comply with Lozada because it 
is common knowledge who Porges is and what crimes he has committed.  According to 
the electronic docket for the Southern District of New York, Porges was indicted in 
September 2000, pleaded guilty in February 2002 to racketeering and tax fraud 
conspiracy, and was sentenced to 97 months in prison.  Because Porges has been 
disbarred, Li contends that he was precluded from filing a complaint against him.  
However, before the IJ, Li was represented by several attorneys from the Porges Law 
Firm:  Estella Viglianco, Victor Ocampo, Charles Chen, Ed Fu, and Gen Chow.  At one 
brief bond hearing, Li was represented by Robert Porges.   
 In a motion to file the brief before the BIA out of time, an attorney named Victoria 
Calle represented that the Porges Law Firm was retained by Li on the date the appellate 
brief was due. (Li had filed a pro se notice of appeal.)  She noted that Li had been 
informed that the firm might not be able to submit a brief due to its lateness and Li agreed 
not to hold counsel accountable.  A.R. at 92.  Li has not shown that Robert Porges was 
involved in the late filing of the brief.  (It appears that Li himself is responsible for the 
late filing.)  Thus, Porges’s conviction does not excuse Li from fulfilling the Lozada 
requirements.  Moreover, as noted by the BIA, Li did not show due diligence in waiting 
over eleven years after the dismissal of his appeal to file his motion to reopen.  His 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel thus do not entitle him to file an untimely 
motion to reopen. 
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 Changed Country Conditions 
 There is an exception to the time and number requirements for motions to reopen 
that rely on material evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of 
nationality.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).  Li argues that circumstances have changed 
materially for Christians in China and supporters of Tibet. 
 With his motion to reopen, Li submitted the 2012 Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices for China.  A.R. at 55-82.  He did not discuss the Report in any detail or 
quote from it.  A.R. at 11-19.  In his brief, he now quotes at length from the 2012 Report 
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the 2012 Department of State 
International Religious Freedom Report for China.  However, neither of these reports is 
in the administrative record.  We may decide a petition for review based only on the 
administrative record.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).  Li asserts in a footnote that the 
Court can take judicial notice of changed conditions in asylum cases.  However, the two 
cases he cites involved the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and a coup in Fiji.  Li 
does not point to any such dramatic event in China that would affect the treatment of 
Christians.  Moreover, we have noted that we do not take judicial notice of new country 
developments.  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 218 (3d Cir. 2005).  Furthermore, Li 
has not shown that these 2012 reports were not available at the time he filed his motion to 
reopen in July 2013. 
 Li contends that the BIA selectively considered the evidence relating to his 
political opinion claim.  Li argued in his motion to reopen that there are changed 
circumstances based on his pro-Tibet activities in the United States.  He also contended 
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that the head of a village committee in China purportedly issued a notice and ordered Li 
to report to the committee’s office due to his involvement in “illegal religious and 
political activities.”  A.R. at 45.  The BIA stated that Li’s documents were unreliable and 
insufficient to support reopening.  It also stated that Li had offered no evidence to support 
his claim that he participated in pro-Tibet activities in the United States.  It concluded 
that he had not shown a change in the conditions in China with regard to returnees who 
are active in pro-Tibet activities in the United States.  A.R. at 5.  We agree. 
 Li appears to argue that the BIA failed to consider the letter from his uncle and the 
issuance of a notice by a village committee as evidence of changed circumstances in 
China for those who support Tibet.  He also contends that the BIA erred in discounting 
those documents as unauthenticated.  The BIA gave Li’s documents little weight due to 
their unreliability.  The BIA observed that the village committee notice was handwritten 
and had not been authenticated in any manner.  It noted that the letter from Li’s uncle 
regarding his arrest was unsworn, created for the litigation, not subject to cross-
examination, and uncorroborated by any police report, medical records, or any other 
documents.  The BIA did not err in the weight given to the documentary evidence. 
 Even accepting the village committee notice as authentic, Li must still show that 
his claim is based on changed country conditions in China for supporters of Tibet and not 
just a change in his personal circumstances based on his activities in the United States.  
Aliens may not manufacture new asylum claims by changing their personal 
circumstances.   See Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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 Li has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to 
reopen.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
